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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. THE "No-CoNTAcr" RULE AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Prosecutorial misconduct can come in many forms, including: asserting
facts without evidence; importing one's own testimony; conflicts of interest;
misstating the law in closing arguments; calling a witness to the stand knowing
that they will claim a privilege against self-incrimination; failure to disclose
material or exculpatory evidence; abuse of prosecutorial discretion; and
improper opening arguments, direct examination, cross-examination, or closing
arguments.I In State v. Chisolm the South Carolina Supreme Court was
confronted with allegations of two other forms, unauthorized contact with a
represented defendant and surreptitious tape recording of conversations with
a defendant. After reviewing the court's decision in Chisolm, this survey will
discuss previous South Carolina decisions involving these latter two types of
prosecutorial misconduct, consider recent developments in the federal system,
and examine the remedies available to aggrieved defendants.
In Chisolm the supreme court upheld the denial of a motion to disqualify
the solicitor and sustained the murder conviction of Carl Chisolm. The court
held that although the solicitor "acted inappropriately" when he communicated
with the accused and surreptitiously tape recorded the telephone conversation,
the defendant failed to show any actual prejudice from the solicitor's
conduct.3
Chisolm was arrested and charged for murder. After police read Chisolm
his Miranda rights and counsel was appointed, Chisolm telephoned from the
jail the assistant solicitor prosecuting his case. During the conversation, the
assistant solicitor explained that he was the prosecutor on the case. Chisolm
informed the solicitor that he understood the solicitor's role, but that he
wanted to proceed with the conversation. The assistant solicitor recorded the
conversation without Chisolm's knowledge.4
Three days later the assistant solicitor informed Chisolm's attorney of the
conversation and gave her the taped recording. The assistant solicitor later
asked defense counsel if Chisoim had requested his removal from the case.
Defense counsel then wrote Chisolm a letter advising him of the ramifications
of his communications with the prosecutor. Nevertheless, Chisolm signed a
written waiver consenting to the assistant solicitor's continuation in the case.'
1. For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of this topic see BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985).
2. - S.C. _, 439 S.E.2d 850 (1994).
3. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 852.
4. Id. at__, 439 S.E.2d at 851.
5. Id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 851.
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Four months later, Chisolm moved to have the assistant solicitor and the
Ninth Circuit Solicitor's office recused from the case. The trial judge found
that the assistant solicitor's actions did not rise to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct required to disqualify the assistant solicitor or the solicitor's office.
At Chisolm's trial, neither the conversation nor the tape recording was
mentioned. Chisolm was subsequently convicted of murder.,
On appeal, Chisolm argued that the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office should
have been disqualified from prosecuting the case because the assistant solicitor
violated principles of professional responsibility. Chisolm asserted that the
solicitor violated Rule 4.2 of the South Carolina Rules of Professional
Conduct7 by communicating with a party known to be represented by counsel.
Chisolm further argued that the assistant solicitor was guilty of ethical
misconduct by surreptitiously tape recording the telephone conversation
without his knowledge or consent. Because of these ethical violations, Chisolm
contended that he was denied fair and even-handed treatment by the solicitor's
office, evidenced by the solicitor's refusal to enter plea negotiations.8
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the assistant
solicitor "acted inappropriately," it sustained Chisolm's conviction because he
failed to show that he had suffered actual prejudice from the trial court's
refusal to disqualify the solicitor's office.9 In finding that no prejudice was
shown, the court stated that there is no constitutional right to a plea bar-
gain.
°
South Carolina applies a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. A court will first review the circumstances to determine whether
the prosecutor did commit some type of ethical, evidentiary or constitutional
violation. If a violation occurred, then the court requires a showing of actual
prejudice to the defendant to order a reversal.11 This framework follows the
general rule of appellate review of procedural and evidentiary trial errors
known as the "harmless error doctrine."12 Chisolm simply reflects this
approach: the assistant solicitor violated ethical principles, yet the court
6. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 851.
7. Rule 4.2 states, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
S.C. APp. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.2.
8. Chisolm, - S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 851.
9. Id. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 852.
10. Id. at , 439 S.E.2d at 852 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
11. See id. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 852 (citing State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686
(1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983)); State v. Merriman, 287 S.C. 74,79-80,337 S.E.2d
218, 222 (Ct. App. 1985).
12. Certain constitutional errors, however, are not subject to harmless error analysis and may
require a per se reversal. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) (citing
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 298, reh'g denied, 500 U.S. 938 (1991)).
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affirmed the conviction because the defendant failed to show any prejudice
resulting from the misconduct.
South Carolina's approach to surreptitious prosecutorial tape recording of
conversations with defendants is embodied in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
"engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion." 3 It further defines misconduct as engaging in "conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice. "14
In a trilogy of cases applying Rule 8.4 and its predecessor under the Code
of Professional Conduct, the South Carolina Supreme Court has characterized
the secret recording of conversations without the knowledge and consent of
parties to the conversation as attorney misconduct. In In re An Anonymous
Member of the South Carolina Bar,5 an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the
court held that an attorney's secret tape recording of a telephone conversation
with the unrepresented driver of a vehicle involved in an accident amounted
to misconduct. 6 Similarly, in In re Warner7 the court found misconduct
where the attorney provided his client with a hidden recording device in an
attempt to secretly record his client's conversation with a family court
judge." The court noted that "[it is equally reprehensible and impermissible
for an attorney to secretly record another attorney or, indeed, another
person."19 In In re An Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar,0
another attorney disciplinary proceeding, the court addressed the issue of
whether an attorney may record a conversation as an alternative means of
taking notes. The court held that the rule barring an attorney from recording
a conversation without the prior knowledge and consent of all parties applied
"irrespective of the purpose(s) for which such recordings were made, the
intent of the parties to the conversation, whether anything of a confidential
nature was discussed, and whether any party gained any unfair advantage from
the recordings. "21
In 1992 the court modified these rulings as applied to investigations
conducted by law enforcement agencies. The court issued its opinion in In Re
Attorney General's Petitione' in response to the South Carolina Attorney
General's assertions that previous rulings barring surreptitious tape recordings
13. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 8.4(d).
14. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(e).
15. 283 S.C. 369, 322 S.E.2d 667 (1984) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 371-72, 322 S.E.2d at 669.
17. 286 S.C. 459, 335 S.E.2d 90 (1985) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 461-62, 335 S.E.2d at 90-91.
19. Id. at 461, 335 S.E.2d at 91.
20. 304 S.C. 342, 404 S.E.2d 513 (1991).
21. Id. at 344, 404 S.E.2d at 514.
22. 308 S.C. 114, 417 S.E.2d 526 (1992).
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caused problems in criminal investigations.' After considering these asser-
tions, the court held that "it is not unethical for an attorney to surreptitiously
record any conversation when that recording is made with the prior consent
of, or at the request of, an appropriate law enforcement agency in the course
of a legitimate criminal investigation. "'
The exceptions outlined in In re Attorney General's Petition did not apply
in Chisolm. The assistant solicitor neither informed nor sought consent from
the defendant prior to recording the telephone conversation." Thus, insofar
as the court found that the prosecutor's surreptitious recording was miscon-
duct, Chisolm is consistent with the general rule prohibiting such conduct.
In addition to the surreptitious tape recording, Chisolm also complained
that the prosecutor's communication with him violated Rule 4.2 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. Application of this rule in the criminal context
presented a novel issue in the South Carolina courts. However, the court's
holding that the assistant solicitor's actions were inappropriate is consistent
with the approach taken in other jurisdictions.26 The plain language of the
rule is clear: communications with a party represented by a lawyer are
prohibited unless the lawyer attempting the communication has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.2 In Chisolm the assistant
23. The Attorney General pointed to five situations where "ethical dilemmas" were created.
The court accepted four:
(1) Where an attorney who is receiving anonymous telephone threats wishes to
record these calls;
(2) Where an attorney wishes to record anonymous information received over
the phone;
(3) Where a government attorney wears a "wire" to surreptitiously record
individual(s) attempting to bribe the attorney; [and]
(5) Where an attorney, himself the subject of a criminal investigation, wishes
to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in part by secretly recording
conversations with other individuals.
Id. at 115, 417 S.E.2d at 526. The court rejected the following exception: "Where a criminal
defendant, represented by an attorney, contacts the Attorney General's Office directly and alleges
his attorney is part of the criminal enterprise." Id. In such a situation, the court opined that a
caller should be told that "the attorney will be recording the conversation in order to maintain
an accurate record should any questions later arise." Id. at 115, 417 S.E.2d at 527.
24. Id. at 115, 417 S.E.2d at 527.
25. Brief of Respondent at 3.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
"[allthough the contact ... was initiated by the defendarit... the refusal of the government
agent to terminate the conversations contributed to a further weakening of the attorney-client
relationship .... "); State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 399-400 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
"[t]here is unanimous and fully documented authority for the proposition that prosecutors are no
less subject to the prohibitions against communications with a represented person than are
members of the private bar." (citations omitted)).
27. S.C. APp. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.2.
1995]
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solicitor communicated directly with the defendant and did not notify the
defense counsel until three days after the conversation.'
The "authorized by law" exception of Rule 4.2 has created considerable
debate between the defense bar and federal prosecutors. The controversy can
be traced to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v.
Hammad (Hammad I)29 that when prosecutors direct informants to contact a
criminal investigation suspect, they violate the rule barring communication.3"
Then Attorney General Richard Thornburgh responded with an internal
Department of Justice memorandum "purporting to exempt all Justice
Department lawyers from the ethics rule on the ground that by virtue of
federal law their law enforcement activities were 'authorized by law' within
the meaning of the rule." 3 This broad interpretation would allow federal
prosecutors to engage in ex parte communications with represented defendants
even during the postindictment periods of a prosecution.32
Federal courts were unwilling to adopt such an expansive approach to the
"authorized by law" exception. For example, in United States v. Lope 3  the
district court squarely rejected the prosecutor's attempt to justify his conduct
as within the authority of the Thomburgh memo. The court noted that "[t]here
are profound flaws in the Attorney General's policy and they are demonstrated
within the four corner's of the Thornburgh Memorandum."' The court
concluded that "it is misguided and not premised on sound legal authority. "35
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted, "[tlhe govern-
ment..., has prudently dropped its dependence on the Thornburgh Memoran-
dum in justifying [the prosecutor's] conduct, and has thereby spared us the
need of reiterating the district court's trenchant analysis of the inefficacy of the
Attorney General's policy statement. "36
28. Chisolm, - S.C. at __, 439 S.E.2d at 851.
29. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990).
30. Id. at 859-60.
31. NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY IN THE PRACTiCE OF LAW,
(forthcoming 1996).
32. For various views on the Thornburgh memorandum, see Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K.
Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversy over the Anti-Contact and
SubpoenaRules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 291, 319-24 (1992); Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty
of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. REv. 1389, 1446-47 (1993); Nancy
J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for an
End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 515, 519-23 (1992); F. Dennis Saylor & 1.
Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to
Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 459, 485-87 (1992).
33. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding misconductwhere prosecutorconductedplea
negotiations without consent of defense counsel), vacated, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 1446.
35. Id. at 1450.
36. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993); see also In re Doe, 801
[Vol. 47
5
et al.: Professional Responsibility
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Second Circuit later withdrew its Hammad I decision. In Hammad
I37 the court held that "a prosecutor is 'authorized by law' to employ
legitimate investigative techniques in conducting or supervising criminal
investigations." 3 Although the Department of Justice continues to assert its
right to exempt government lawyers from the operation of state ethics rules
under the Supremacy Clause, the Department has decided not to implement a
wholesale exemption. Under the new rule, 39 federal attorneys "may not
negotiate plea bargains, settlement agreements, immunity agreements, or
similar arrangements without the consent of the individual's attorney."'
However, direct contact is permitted in the "preindictment, prearrest
investigative stage with any individual, whether or not he or she is represented
by counsel."41 Six specific exceptions are also provided to allow for commu-
nications with represented parties.42 It is unclear how application of the new
regulation will be received in the federal courts.4 3
A court may impose a variety of remedies when dealing with misconduct,
including dismissal of the indictment, disqualification of the individual
prosecutor or of the entire office, reversal, suppression of evidence, contempt,
fines, public or private reprimand, imposition of a court's own disciplinary
rules by temporarily suspending the prosecutor from practicing before the
court, and removal.' Additionally, state bar associations can impose their
own disciplinary sanctions, and, in certain circumstances, misconduct may
form part of the basis for a civil action.4
In recent years some commentators have criticized the judiciary's control
of prosecutorial excess as ineffective because of self-imposed restraint on the
use of the judiciary's inherent supervisory powers. 46 The "supervisory
F. Supp. 478, 487 (D.N.M. 1992).
37. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990).
38. Id. at 839.
39. Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codified
at 28 CFR § 77).
40. Id. at 39,912.
41. Id.
42. These include: (1) determining if representation exists; (2) discovery or judicial process;
(3) imitation of communication by the represented party (includes discrete sub requirements); (4)
waivers at the time of arrest; (5) investigation of additional, different or ongoing crimes or civil
violations; and (6) threat to safety or life. Id.
43. In the rulemaking history portion of the regulation, the Department of Justice addressed
three main concerns from critics: "(1) the need for the rule; (2) the constitutional and statutory
authority for the rule; and (3) the sufficiency of the rule's internal enforcement mechanisms."
59 Fed. Reg. 39,913.
44. GERSHMAN, supra note 1, §§ 13.1-13.5.
45. Id. §§ 13.6-13.7.
46. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393,433-36
1995]
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doctrine has become an empty shell, liberating prosecutors from a potential
check on their authority, and serving mostly as a reminder to lower federal
courts not to usurp the prosecutor's prerogative." 47 Furthermore, United
States Supreme Court rulings over the last two decades may have effectively
left the supervisory doctrine toothless.48
Two interrelated judicial remedies for prosecutorial misconduct were at
issue in Chisolm: disqualification of the solicitor's office and reversal of the
conviction. Had Chisolm shown actual prejudice from the trial court's failure
to disqualify the solicitor's office, reversal and retrial likely would have
followed. 49 Reversal of a conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct is
"strong medicine" that has evoked considerable controversy. Judge Learned
Hand criticized appellate reversal as an inefficient way to penalize the
prosecutor because "it would accomplish little towards punishing the offender,
and would upset the conviction of a plainly guilty man. . . .[I]t seems to us
that reversal would be an immoderate penalty." 5 Another traditional view
against reversal is that ethics rules impose duties upon lawyers, and do not
vest rights to third parties.5
Professor Bennett Gershman, however, has called the harmless error
rule's prejudice requirement a "jurisdictional fiasco" that:
modifies prosecutorial behavior in the most pernicious fashion: it tacitly
informs prosecutors that they can weigh the commission of evidentiary or
procedural violations not against a legal or ethical standard of appropriate
conduct, but rather, against an increasingly accurate prediction that the
appellate courts will ignore the misconduct when sufficient evidence exists
to prove the defendant's guilt.
52
Professor Gershman specifically asserts that the harmless error rule is a result-
oriented approach that shifts the focus from fairness to guilt, "places the
appellate court in the jury box," and results in such routine affirmances that
(1992); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521,
1568 (1981); Douglas P. Currier, Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand
Jury Indictment-A Basisfor Curbing ProsecutorialMisconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077,1094-98,
(1984).
47. Gershman, supra note 46, at 433 (footnote omitted).
48. See id. at 431-35, (citing, inter alia, United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983));
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
49. Chisolm, __ S.C. at _, 439 S.E.2d at 852.
50. GERSHMAN, supra note 1, § 13.2 (quoting United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 37 (2d
Cir. 1939)) (alterations in original).
51. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 32, at 350.
52. Gershman, supra note 46, at 425 (footnote omitted).
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the courts, "by condoning prosecutorial lawlessness, are themselves promoting
disrespect for the law. "5
These criticisms are especially cogent when one considers the facts of
Chisolm. First, the very nature of the case made it difficult to specifically
identify or quantify the prejudice to the defendant. Because the State never
introduced the taped recording, the defendant could not possibly show any
different trial result. Furthermore, there was no practical way to show the
impact that the conversation had on the State's investigation or case prepara-
tion. The court's insistence on a showing of actual prejudice, when combined
with its refusal to consider anything other' than the evidence actually
introduced at trial, subtly shifts the focus of the inquiry away from whether the
defendant was treated fairly to whether he was in fact guilty. It is difficult to
imagine that the court's affirmance of the conviction had any deterrent effect
on the assistant solicitor or the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office. The court
neither chastised nor admonished the solicitor to refrain from such conduct in
the future. Instead, the court euphemistically termed his two violations of
ethical rules as merely "inappropriate." Such minimal condemnation is
unlikely to have much deterrent effect on future prosecutorial transgressions.
In one sense, State v. Chisolm represents a step forward in that the court
acknowledged further application of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
to solicitors as well as private attorneys. In another sense, the holding
perpetuates the status quo by declining to take more meaningful steps to deter
solicitors from violating ethics rules. If the past is any indication, unless new
standards are adopted, prosecutors need not be overly concerned with full
compliance with the rules.
Robert Sneed
53. GERSHMAN, supra note 1, § 13.2(a)(1).
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